Transsystemia - Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment - Is McGill Leading the Way by Strauss, Peter L.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 24
Number 4 Penn State International Law Review Article 6
5-1-2006
Transsystemia - Are We Approaching a New
Langdellian Moment - Is McGill Leading the Way
Peter L. Strauss
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Strauss, Peter L. (2006) "Transsystemia - Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment - Is McGill Leading the Way," Penn State
International Law Review: Vol. 24: No. 4, Article 6.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol24/iss4/6
Transsystemia-Are We Approaching a
New Langdellian Moment?-Is McGill
Leading the Way?*
Peter L. Strauss**
Dean Parker put it well in addressing the problem of our slowness
and the importance of epiphanies. I want to suggest a frame of reference
to you about the forward and back part. What I want you to imagine is a
jurisdiction of roughly twenty-five different states, each of which has its
own body of law independent of the others. And each has its own law
schools. What law will lawyers learn in each of these states? Now
imagine that something happens that unites these twenty-five bodies in a
quite concrete way. The economy shifts so that the economy becomes an
economy for the whole unit of twenty-five, rather than separate
economies for each of the twenty-five. How will law-teaching change?
A shift like this has happened twice that I am going to speak to. It
happened once here, shortly after the Civil War, when our economies
effectively merged into a thoroughly national economy. And recently it
happened again in Europe, as twenty-five nations became a single
economy. Now, think for a moment about legal education in Europe,
and whether it makes any more sense for a Belgian lawyer today just to
learn Belgian law, or perhaps I will call it national law, then it made one
hundred years ago for someone in the emerging national economy of the
United States to learn just New York law. You probably have a point of
view about that. I hope you do, but this is a way of presenting my
epiphany, which I hope to share with you. This should explain to you the
first part of the title of my talk, "Are We Approaching a New
Langdellian Moment?"
* This is a transcript of the oral delivery of a paper that is being published in the
December 2006 issue of the Journal of Legal Education.
** Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This essay would not have been
possible without the support of the Fulbright Senior Specialist program, which made it
possible for me to spend September 2005 at McGill University's Faculty of Law, and
without the many personal and professional kindnesses shown me by that remarkable
faculty. This is a transcript of the oral delivery of a paper that is being published in the
December 2006 issue of the Journal of Legal Education.
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When this country emerged from the Civil War and reconstruction
began, Columbia Law School, which is my law school, was the country's
leading law school. Timothy Dwight's method of instruction, which
combined textbooks and lectures with classroom hypotheticals and notes,
did the best job in the country in educating people for the bar.
Everybody knew that, and many people came to Columbia. Then
Charles Eliot hired Christopher Columbus Langdell as the new dean at
Harvard, and he set about transforming the way legal education was
delivered there. And do you know what happened next? More firms
started hiring Harvard lawyers. Langdell's new method worked to
produce a graduate well-adapted to the new circumstances of the
marketplace. Columbia imported William Keener from Harvard to bring
his method to Columbia so that we could compete. Professor Dwight
didn't like that at all, and retired in a huff. Many of his colleagues left
Columbia to found the New York Law School. They took a lot of
Columbia Law students with them, and their school immediately became
the country's second largest. Within thirteen years, it was the country's
largest law school. We persisted with the Keener method-the Socratic
Method-as did other elite law schools. Yale too, at some point, caught
on and imported the new method.
How do we explain the new method's general success, first at elite
schools and then throughout the American law school world? My
explanation is that the Socratic Method freed law schools from teaching
the law of a particular jurisdiction, from teaching law from texts, as if it
were the law of that state that lawyers had to know. Students no longer
learned doctrines through the eyes of a distinguished commentator. They
did the hard work of synthesis for themselves. A day in such a class,
organized around a conceptual problem such as consideration, could hop
from eighteenth-century England to twentieth-century Massachusetts to
nineteenth-century New York, and students needn't pay attention to that.
Back-and-forth in time and space their studies went. The law firms that
were serving an increasingly national business community found that
they particularly valued lawyers that came out of that process, for these
were lawyers confident of their capacity to work in any of the country's
jurisdictions. I go to a law school in New York, but I leave ready to
practice in California, or Minnesota, or Florida. I take some intensive,
awful three-week bar course so that I can get over that state's particular
hurdles, but I have confidence. We have succeeded in making our
graduates confident that they can practice anywhere in the country. That
was the transformation that Langdell brought about.
A few decades later, other changes spoke more to the question what
a faculty of law was doing in a university. Legal realism challenged
formalism and technical analysis, the idea of law as an autonomous
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enterprise unconnected to social fact. Its changes reached across
disciplines, made of law an intellectual study more than simple
professional habilitation, and made of law school graduates lawyers more
cosmopolitan in outlook, training and practice. There was another
tragedy at Columbia around that, but I don't want to get into local history
too much.
So, another way of describing the Langdellian change was that it
made American law teachers into comparative lawyers. All American
law teachers of private law subjects, I would suggest, are already in the
business of teaching comparative law. In a class that assesses the
contract rules of New York against those of Minnesota, that analyzes
majority against minority rule, those that served yesterday's society
against today's society, what else is it that we are doing? Another way
of describing the move to legal realism is that it made us comparative in
the trans-disciplinary sense. Why does it matter if the study of social
contexts within which transactions of concern to lawyers occur crosses
state or national lines? Were the differences between, say, Texas and
New York in 1920 of another dimension or kind than the differences
between France and Spain today?
Well, today (I don't think I have to say this, but I will) national
businesses have become international businesses. A graduate of ours
remarked to me a few years ago that 85% of the transactions that crossed
his desk at a not particularly international New York law firm had one
foot or another in a distant country. This is like finding a businessman
on his way home from Asia sitting next to you on your trip across the
country. Nor is the American way of doing law the one inevitably
chosen by other states, as Dean Parker has suggested. The fact of the
European Community has made it just as inadequate to learn just Belgian
law today, as it had become to learn just New York law twelve decades
ago. And European lawyers, recognizing this, flock to our shores in
droves to acquire the LLM. Is there a comparable countercurrent? And
even if there were, would that be adequate?
We have to take the next step, not just because general interest in
the world of law is more seemly, more intellectual, than a profession-
driven interest in the common law, but also, in my judgment, because the
changing market for legal services will reward the schools that adapt and
punish those that do not. That is to say, we have to learn to train lawyers
who can adapt as readily to the differing legal systems of varying nations
as our graduates today can adapt to the different legal systems of the fifty
states.
Now we get to the second part of the title, "Is McGill leading the
way?" You will hear later this afternoon, in the last concurrent session,
from Rosalie Jukier, of the McGill faculty. She will be able to tell you a
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lot more about this than I can. But let me try just to say a little bit on the
basis of the month that I spent this fall at McGill, at the very beginning
of first year legal education, watching how that faculty in civil law
Quebec starts its students into legal education. Quebec is an island of the
civil law in the Commonwealth of Canada, as I suppose you know. And
I might start with another little anecdote: Ten years ago or so, I asked
one of our Canadian graduate students, who had studied at the University
of Toronto, "When you studied contracts, how many of the contracts
cases that you studied involved transactions that had a relationship to
Montreal?" The answer was zero. Utterly astounding to me, but there it
was, the answer was zero. Not sustainable, and I think changing.
So, I spent a month at McGill watching that first year class start,
trying to understand what was different. How, if at all, could an
American law school adapt what it was doing? And I want to try and
capture a few moments of the experience for you.
The first was a faculty seminar on the emptiness of comparative law
as a discipline. Of course, the presenter didn't mean that comparisons
shouldn't be made-rather, that it wasn't any different from what all of
them were doing all of the time. Just as we don't offer specialized
courses in comparative law of the states, we just all do it all of the time,
they do not think of doing it at the national level. One colleague
forcefully told me, "We offer no course called Comparative Law. Our
students would rise in rebellion if we did."
Legal education starts very differently at McGill than it does here.
Every student is expected to bring the Quebec Civil Code to class every
day, along with the cases for the day. But the real difference was that it
was well into the third week before I heard any case or statute discussed
at all. Early meetings were given over to historical exegesis, or to
theoretical writing that tended to emphasize the commonalities among
the kinds of problems that people bring to lawyers, the
unrepresentativeness of the cases that become prominent, the parallel
histories of intellectual developments in European legal systems and in
the common law, however different the names given to them. At a
discussion among most of the first year teachers, one colleague voiced
quite forcefully an explicit understanding among them: That the first
weeks of teaching would actively avoid contributing to a "two camps"
understanding of the enterprise. Common law cases at McGill are almost
as likely to be American, Australian, or British as Canadian. "North
American law" is a phrase that I often heard used. Active
demystification and scene-setting appeared to be the rule, along with
expressions of confidence that "you will be able to do this for yourself
soon; for the moment, I'm just modeling for you what you will need to
learn to do." Nobody was put on the spot; volunteers were welcome. I
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heard some extraordinary interventions, which were rarely off the mark.
In a meeting with first year students, they expressed a lot of pleasure at
the cooperative atmosphere, the willingness of people to share notes, the
faculty support that they were encountering. I didn't hear a word of
anxiety about their having to learn the common law system and the civil
law system side-by-side. That was of course what they had to do. This
was what they were going to be dealing with in their professional lives.
Legal systems were presented as being as much a part of a lawyer's
toolkit as we think our own hermeneutic structures are. What actually
happens in the world that might bring a person to a lawyer's office, what
one colleague there pungently styled "the pre-legal blah, blah, blah," is
just as independent of the legal system that happens to be in place, as of
the particularly limiting analytic structures which that system employs,
and that a lawyer therefore has to learn to use in order to be an effective
professional. The students get this quickly.
Two principal courses of the first year bring this home. McGill
teaches neither "Contracts" nor "Obligation," but "Contractual
Obligations"; "Extra-contractual Obligations" captures what we would
call "Torts," and what the French might call "Delit." These courses are
organized around a series of presenting problems: Have the parties
reached what the law will recognize to be a binding accord? What kinds
of injuries will be recognized as warranting legal redress and to what
extent? Code provisions and cases addressing these problems are
presented as data to animate the discussion. Neither civil nor common
law has priority; both are simply there, as both the majority rule and
minority rule might be in the common law context.
Stating the case isn't an early priority. I heard it done in only one
September class I visited. And when cases are discussed, they are
discussed as illustrations of the law's intellectual structures, much as this
morning Jack stressed that he does. People aren't asked, at least not yet,
to put this case together with that one, or to explore the possibilities of
meaning in a statutory or codal text. What are explored, rather, are the
intellectual structures that law brings to the resolution of disputes, and
the difficulties those structures present. One McGill professor explained
to me that students walk in the door having already chosen to be
lawyers-that is not a problem, and thinking like a lawyer will come-
but the outset of legal education is the moment when one might be able
to get them thinking about law in an intellectual and not in an
instrumental way.
A few of the upper-class students I talked to remarked that they
hadn't really come to appreciate either system, common law or civil law,
until their second year. In that year they take courses in advanced
common law and advanced civil law that focus on the workings of each
2006]
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particular system. Only then, for example, do they learn to see the
Quebec Civil Code as a whole and focus on the interaction of its several
books, or on the particular interpretive skills and secondary literature that
a well-trained civilian would need to have. But colleagues assured me
that this is exactly what they intended. Students reach this point without
having made general judgments about better or worse, simply having
treated the common law and civil law as different, wholly contingent
social ways for reaching generally similar outcomes in respect of
generally similar problems-the "pre-legal blah, blah, blah"--that might
bring a person to a lawyer's office.
Under McGill's prior National Program, students had started with a
year in one system, common law or civil law, and then spent their second
year learning the other system. What the faculty found was that this
produced adherents. If you started on the common law side, you became
a common law lawyer who knew something about the civil law. If you
started on the civil law side, you became a civil law lawyer who knew
something about the common law. Keeping system-specific training
largely for the second year has changed this. People might think that
they know where they are going and prepare accordingly, as some of our
students think they are going to California, and others to New York. But
the school is neutral to this. It hasn't any stake.
Note in this a certain advantage for those of us who think law is the
queen of the social sciences and not just an agglomeration of
propositions and practices best understood through the prism of other
disciplines. A McGill graduate who read an early draft of this talk put it
this way: "Working across systems, students are made to understand
how contingent law as a professional practice and as theory is-to
perceive law as escaping systematization and [to understand] that
lawyers mold legal practices to fit and shape constantly shifting social
practices and moral understandings."
Now, one can't attend McGill's classes or explore its teaching
materials without recognizing that McGill has some natural advantages.
It is no accident that this happened in Montreal and specifically at
McGill:
* Montreal is actually bi-lingual, as Canada is formally
bilingual.
" In consequence, the literatures of two great legal traditions
are easily available to students there.
* The politics of possible separation both pushes Quebec's
leading Anglophonic intellectual institution towards
building possible bridges of national unity, and creates an
atmosphere of challenge that is highly conducive to
collegial coordination and sacrifice.
[Vol. 24:4
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Finally, there is the history of building to this moment.
Transsystemia didn't arise overnight. McGill only began
offering a common law degree at all in 1970. Frustration
with this first bijural program led to the National Program,
which I just briefly described to you. Only after that
program, too, revealed its inadequacies was the current
approach adopted. The result is that the faculty has been
teaching the two systems side-by-side and considering the
results continuously, for more than three decades. This
has made it a lot easier to explore new paths, and has
reduced the intellectual capital that one must sacrifice in
order to do so. This, in my judgment, is the primary
reason for our own slowness to adapt. Intellectual capital
is really at stake. People who have grown up learning and
teaching the domestic law of the United States are
suddenly faced with a need to do something quite
different.
So, the other side of McGill's advantages are the obstacles that an
American law school would face in moving to legal education that is as
indifferent to systemic differences as ours now is to state lines within the
domestic common law world:
* First, we can't rely on our students to be bilingual-much
less in languages that fortuitously embrace two of the great
legal literatures. This is a challenge for McGill, too, in a
somewhat different way. They don't have the German
literature, so there is a risk of confusing France with the
civil law world. And, there are even larger difficulties
when one moves from the comfortable juxtaposition of
legal systems sharing deep cultural and social affinities to,
say, aboriginal law, or a non-western system that is neither
liberal-democratic nor market-oriented.
" Second, neither we nor our students have quite the same
incentives, political or professional, as exist in Quebec.
For us as teachers, perhaps the incentives are largely
intellectual, and they do involve a great deal of effort. For
our students, the incentives are perhaps more dependent on
career path than may appear to a McGill student today.
* Third, and relatedly for us as experienced teachers, is that
we would likely have more intellectual capital at stake
than the McGill faculty had in making this change. Save
for those of us whose self-identify as comparativists, that
specialty that McGillians deny, our private law faculty is
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used to the common (that is to say, domestic) law. Our
courts, some indicator of how we think about law, are
rather less open than the Canadian to the consideration of
external sources, even in matters of human rights. Our
teaching materials are rich with comparison and depth
already, but these are common law comparisons. It is a lot
easier to continue in an accustomed path.
So, one can't expect to reach transsystemia overnight. Getting past
the obstacles-particularly I think, the one of intellectual capital that so
often obstructs our changes-is going to require ramps, not TNT. I
might recommend a few strategies:
* The first one is faculty hiring. Hire young colleagues who
are well-trained in civil law or even better, transsystemia,
and put them in first year courses with encouragement to
change them. We imported Keener from Harvard; most of
us today regularly drink at the realist well of Yale. I
wonder if tomorrow's source might be McGill. If you do
this, the upper-class curriculum will take care of itself, as it
has at McGill, where upper-class teachers just have to
meet the expectations first year teaching has engendered.
They don't have a choice about it.
* Second, a bit of promotion, consider as a second semester,
first year course, one like that which my colleagues at
George Bermann and Katharina Pistor are creating for
Columbia with the help of Mark Drumbl of Washington &
Lee. This is a stand-alone one semester course that revisits
problems from each of the other first year courses through
an international or foreign domestic law lens, thus
requiring students to expand their field of vision. For
myself, I would require this as a first year course; it is in
my judgment utterly essential, for all of the reasons we
have heard. And, I have to confess, my faculty has not yet
reached the point of discussing this.
* Third, imagine some upper-class courses as transsystemic
courses and staff them accordingly. Admiralty, conflict of
laws, secured transactions-these are courses that come
readily to mind. Of course, one can teach these courses in
conventional ways, so you have to choose instructors who
recognize the importance of structuring the courses to free
them from any particular legal system-the importance of
requiring students to develop the flexibility and
understanding to come at their common problems from
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any systemic angle. And, if that means reducing coverage
in the conventional sense, which is in fact a common
experience at McGill, that seems to me to be a reduction
well bought.
And finally, build for the long-term. McGill took over
three-and-a-half decades to reach the point that it has
currently attained, and that under the favorable conditions
that I have talked about. Its leadership has self-
consciously been building faculty to this end since the
1980's. With its success demonstrated and with teaching
materials resulting (and also emerging from the West
Conference last summer), others may not require as long-
even given the differing obstacles we face. Yet we
certainly can't imagine instantaneous change. NYU's
Global Law Program may look quite different in the
hindsight of 2020-that is to say, in the year 2020-than it
does today.
Not every law school will or perhaps even should attempt so
dramatic a shift. Cities, states and nation will continue to need lawyers
whose training suits them to domestic practice. Schools make their
choices. Mine has never offered a course in New York practice-a
mistake, perhaps, as most of the other law schools in my state do offer
such a course. On the other side of things, it may be that transsystemia
will have less appeal to schools serving local or even regional bars, than
to schools that invite the world and imagine their graduates dispersing
widely throughout it. I think that this is going to be market-driven.
Firms now hiring young lawyers, like those New York firms in the late
nineteenth century, are going to favor schools that they find prepare their
graduates well for the realities of their firms' practice, whatever those
realities are. Some European law schools today, under national
guidance, may still be teaching as if national law were the only law a
well-trained lawyer needed to know. I wonder if they aren't going to
find, if this continues, that their graduates are finding work principally in
firms dealing only with problems of local law, and that the graduates of
law schools in other places, Belgium say, are being hired for jobs that
require more flexibility, broader understanding, a more European
perspective. Or else their graduates, harboring broader ambitions, will
find themselves having to seek supplementary education someplace else.
You can connect the dots.
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